Die Befugnis des Aufsichtsrats zu vorstandsunabhängigen Mitarbeiterkontakten
Untersuchung de lege lata und de lege ferenda im Lichte des § 107 Abs. 4 Satz 4 AktG
'The Supervisory Board's Authority to Contact Employees Independently of the Management Board - An Analysis de lege lata and de lege ferenda in Light of Section 107 (4) Sentence 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)': The thesis explores whether the supervisory board may engage with employees independently of the management board - and whether a statutory extension is necessary. Drawing on the legal concept of ancillary powers and taking into account economic considerations, the analysis reveals that stock corporation law already provides more extensive powers than commonly assumed. A general right to direct information can be derived dogmatically and should be explicitly codified.
Show moreAvailable, delivery time: 1-3 days
Only a few items left!
More info about condition
€89.90
Prices incl. VAT plus Shipping costs
14-day satisfaction guarantee
Order risk-free
Checked used goods
Individually checked
Product information "Die Befugnis des Aufsichtsrats zu vorstandsunabhängigen Mitarbeiterkontakten"
Login
Free shipping from €29
14-day return policy – no risk
Quality-checked used goods