Logic

Metaphysik und Logik rechnen die Beziehungen der Bewusstseinsvermögen gewöhnlich nicht zu den logischen Beziehungen. Eine Ausnahme ist Kants Unterordnung der Sinnlichkeit unter das Verstandesvermögen in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Logik lehrt außerdem, bei der Anschauung erhalte man stets nur einen einzigen Gegenstand, womit Kant die Geschichte zugleich rekapituliert und prädeterminiert. Fragt man nach der Umkehrbarkeit des Bestimmungsverhältnisses unter den Fakultäten, ergibt sich aber keine Falschheit oder Unmöglichkeit. Es eröffnet sich ein breites Feld an Möglichkeiten, die echte Determination in die Fakultäten zu verlegen und die Formen der Erkenntnis hiervon abhängig zu machen. Die Geschichte der Projektion wird in den Zeugenstand berufen, inklusive einer abschließenden Neubewertung der Korrespondenz.

Ein Mann und seine Familie haben ein Meer aus Feuer überlebt, das ihre Heimat zu Asche verbrannt hat. Die Tage sind nun dunkel und düster. Es gibt kaum noch Nahrungsmittel und Trinkwasser. In den Nächten herrscht eine undurchdringliche Finsternis. Die Ehefrau des Mannes ermordet schließlich ihre beiden Kinder und begeht Selbstmord. Der Mann folgt ihnen nicht in den Tod. Er glaubt, dass es irgendwo noch eine bunte, lebendige Welt gibt, die er finden muss, um leben zu können und nicht sterben zu müssen. So macht er sich auf den Weg durch die Asche der verbrannten Erde, um diese Welt zu suchen. Doch der Tod lässt ihn nicht mehr aus den Augen und jeden Tag muss er um sein Leben kämpfen. Aber durch die Kämpfe, die er zu bestehen hat und durch die Menschen, die er auf seinem Weg trifft, zeigt ihm diese neue und dunkle Welt aus Asche, was es in Wahrheit bedeutet, ein Mensch zu sein. So wird seine Suche nach einer nicht zerstörten, heilen Welt auch zu einer Reise in sein innerstes Selbst, zu einer Reise in das kalte Herz der Finsternis...

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Für das Verständnis der Philosophie Immanuel Kants eröffnen sich neue Einsichten, wenn man neben den Druckschriften auch Kants Vorlesungen beizieht. Im vorliegenden Band werden unter dieser Maßgabe zentrale Aspekte der Kantischen Philosophie - Metaphysik, Logik, Anthropologie sowie Moral-, Rechts- und Religionsphilosophie - beleuchtet und neu gedeutet. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage nach den Grenzen des Wissens, wie Kant sie in seiner Transzendentalphilosophie beschrieben hat, und dem durch diese Grenzbestimmung eröffneten Freiraum des Glaubens. Diese Einhegung der theoretischen Philosophie hat weitreichende Folgen für die Anthropologie. Der Mensch ist frei, die obersten Maximen seines Handelns - seine Gesinnung - zu bestimmen. Dafür trägt er Verantwortung. Welche Wirkung eine Entscheidung zeitigt, bleibt ihm verborgen. Kants Beharren auf der Unerkennbarkeit der 'Dinge an sich' gewinnt hier seinen vollen anthropologischen Ernst.

Drawing a line, and then another, and another. Go back from the lines to the movements they capture and see gestures in them: not spatial displacements, but modes of knowledge that pass through the exercise of the body. Discovering something new in a gesture: the line that contracts into a point or the point that expands into a zone, perhaps sinking into a hole. Thus experiencing a diagram: a becoming other inscribed in the novelty of the gesture and in the changes of the forms it shapes. This and much more is discussed in the essays gathered in Diagrams and Gestures. Resulting from trans-disciplinary work between mathematicians, philosophers, linguists and semioticians, the volume delivers an up-to-date account of the most valuable research on the connections between gesture and diagram. As one of the most important themes in contemporary thought, the study of these connections poses a challenge for the future: to elaborate a theory that is equal to new and stimulating research methodologies. We call this theory a philosophy of diagrammatic gestures.

The idea of a knowledge base lies at the heart of symbolic or "good old-fashioned" artificial intelligence (GOFAI). A knowledge-based systemdecides how to act by running formal reasoning procedures over a body of explicitly represented knowledge, its knowledge base. The system isnot programmed for specific tasks; rather, it is told what it needs to know, and expected to infer the rest.This book is about the logic of such knowledge bases. It describes in detail the relationship between symbolic representations of knowledge and abstract states of knowledge, exploring along the way, the foundations of knowledge, knowledge bases, knowledge-based systems, and knowledge representation and reasoning. Assuming some familiarity with first-order predicate logic, the book offers a rigorous mathematical model of knowledge that is general and expressive, yet more workable in practice than previous models.The first edition of the book appeared in the year 2000, and since then its model of knowledge has been applied and extended in a number of ways.This second edition incorporates a number of new results about the logic of knowledge bases, including default reasoning, reasoning about actionand change, and tractable reasoning.Hector Levesque is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto. Gerhard Lakemeyer is Professor and Chair of the Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, and Professor (status only) in the Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto.

Hegel erhebt den Anspruch, in seiner Konzeption der Vernunft subjektives Denken und soziale Wirklichkeit versöhnt zu haben. Kritische Theorie weist diesen Anspruch ab, knüpft jedoch an den Begriff der objektiven Vernunft an, um ihm eine nicht-metaphysische Form zu geben. In dieser Perspektive prüft Schiller zentrale Begriffe von Hegels Logik und seiner Rechtsphilosophie auf ihre Aktualität und verfolgt die kritische Transformation des Begriffs objektiver Vernunft bei Marx und Adorno. Obwohl Hegel die politischen Kompromissgebilde seiner Zeit zum Abbild der ewigen Vernunft verklärte, gelangen ihm tiefe Einblicke in die Widersprüche der modernen Welt, die auch heute noch verstörend und erhellend sind.

This book is a Festschrift dedicated to Klaus-Dieter Schewe on the occasion of his 60th birthday. It contains contributions by his students, colleagues, and friends. The articles, written by computer scientists, mathematicians, and logicians, address recent research trends in areas such as rigorous methods, databases, mathematical reasoning and conceptual modeling.

Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.

This book explores new territory at the interface between semantics and pragmatics, reassessing a number of linguistic phenomena in the light of recent advances in pragmatic theory. It presents stimulating insights by experts in linguistics and philosophy, including Kent Bach, Philippe de Brabanter, Max Kölbel and François Recanati. The authors begin by reassessing the definition of four theoretical concepts: saturation, free pragmatic enrichment, completion and expansion. They go on to confront (sub)disciplines that have addressed similar issues but that have not necessarily been in close contact, and then turn to questions related to reported speech, modality, indirect requests and prosody.Chapters investigate lexical pragmatics and (cognitive) lexical semantics and other interactions involving experimental pragmatics, construction grammar, clinical linguistics, and the distinction between mental and linguistic content. The authors bridge the gap between different disciplines, subdisciplines and methodologies, supporting cross-fertilization of ideas and indicating the empirical studies that are needed to test current theoretical concepts and push the theory further.Readers will find overviews of the ways in which concepts are defined, empirical data with which they are illustrated and explorations of the theoretical frameworks in which concepts are couched. This exciting exchange of ideas has its origins in the editors' workshop series on the theme 'The semantics/pragmatics interface: linguistic, logical and philosophical perspectives', held at the University of Lille 3 in 2012-13. Scholars of linguistics, logic and philosophy and those interested in the research benefits of crossing disciplines will find this work both accessible and thought-provoking, especially those with an interest in pragmatic theory or semantics.

23:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam

The IfColog Journal of Logics and their Applications covers all areas of pure and applied logic, broadly construed. This Journal is open access, and available in both printed and electronic formats. It is published by College Publications, on behalf of IfCoLoG (www.ifcolog.net).

23:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam

THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS is the only book-length philosophical work published by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. The project had a broad aim - to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of science - and is recognized as a significant philosophical work of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein wrote the notes for the Tractatus while he was a soldier during World War I and completed it when a prisoner of war at Como and later Cassino in August 1918. It was first published in German in 1921 as 'Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung'. The Tractatus was influential chiefly amongst the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, such as Rudolf Carnap and Friedrich Waismann. Bertrand Russell's article "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" is presented as a working out of ideas that he had learned from Wittgenstein. (more on: www.wisehouse-classisc.com)

The IfColog Journal of Logics and their Applications covers all areas of pure and applied logic, broadly construed. This Journal is open access, and available in both printed and electronic formats. It is published by College Publications, on behalf of IfCoLoG (www.ifcolog.net).

Diese Reihe bietet ein Forum für innovative Beiträge zur Logik und zur modernen Sprachphilosophie ebenso wie für Studien zur analytischen Metaphysik.

This unique anthology of new, contributed essays offers a range of perspectives on various aspects of ontic vagueness. It seeks to answer core questions pertaining to onticism, the view that vagueness exists in the world itself. The questions to be addressed include whether vague objects must have vague identity, and whether ontic vagueness has a distinctive logic, one that is not shared by semantic or epistemic vagueness. The essays in this volume explain the motivations behind onticism, such as the plausibility of mereological vagueness and indeterminacy in quantum mechanics and they offer various arguments both for and against ontic vagueness; onticism is also compared with other, competing theories of vagueness such as semanticism, the view that vagueness exists only in our linguistic representation of the world.Gareth Evans's influential paper of 1978, "Can There Be Vague Objects?" gave a simple but cogent argument against the coherence of ontic vagueness. Onticism was subsequently dismissed by many. However, in recent years, researchers have become aware of the logical gaps in Evans's argument and this has triggered a new wave of interest in onticism. Onticism is now widely regarded as at least a coherent view. Reflecting this growing consensus, the present anthology for the first time puts together essays that are focused on onticism and its various facets and it fills in the lacuna in the literature on vagueness, a much-discussed subject in contemporary philosophy.